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2. Patent challenge decision
Market conditions
Analysis and Results
Evaluate various aspects of the innovator’s patent 
licensing behavior and gain insight into the patenting 
decision making process under different market 
conditions using an economic experiment. 
Specifically we examine:
1. whether patentees are more likely to license broad 
versus narrow  patents (theoretical findings 
suggest that broad patents are more likely to be 
licensed).
2. the likelihood of patent licensing, patent 
infringement and patent litigation given the type 
of the potential entrant (weak versus strong).
Objective
Patenting is one of the strongest forms of intellectual 
property protection but it does not always result in 
the highest possible payoffs for innovators. Patents 
can be challenged after grant either via a direct 
validity challenge and/or via infringement, which 
can be very costly (average litigation costs exceed $3 
million per side (Hsieh 2006)), and the outcome may 
be unfavorable for the patentee.1
So when should firms patent their innovations and 
when should they choose trade secrecy? If the 
decision to patent is made, how broad should the 
protection claimed be? When should firms litigate 
under infringement and when should they license 
their patents? 
Data on patent granting, litigation and licensing has 
limited use in empirically studying patenting 
behavior and understanding the patenting decision 
making process as one can only observe the ex-post 
decisions (whether the innovation has been patented 
or not, licensed or not or whether a trial has taken 
place or not) and not the decision making process 
itself. Economic experiments allow for empirical 
analysis without such problems.
A computerized interactive choice experiment where 
subjects participated in a series of games (strategic 
interactions) was developed.
• Each game simulated specific market conditions.
• The subjects were randomly and anonymously 
paired up and assumed the role of an 
innovator/patentee or a potential entrant. 
• Innovators decided whether to license their patents 
and whether to invoke a trial if infringement 
occurred.
• Entrants decided whether to buy a license and in 
the absence of licensing whether and how to enter 
in the market (via infringement or non-
infringement).
• Under licensing, the licensing fee was determined 
through bargaining.
Each decision of interest was analyzed separately.
The analysis was performed using the GLIMMIX 
procedure in SAS 9.2 ©
The binary distribution and the logit link options in 
GLIMMIX were used because of the binary nature of 
each dependent variable.
• The likelihood of patent challenge was greater for 
broad rather than narrow patents.
• Weak rivals were more likely to challenge patents 
than strong rivals.
• A patent was more likely to be challenged when no 
licensing offer was made.
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Figure 1: An Example of the Six 
Different Scenarios
The questions of interest were examined under 6 
different scenarios that determined whether the 
licensing outcome is affected by:
a. The nature of the bargaining process during 
which the licensing fee is determined (one shot 
game versus multiple interactions).
b. Who initiates the bargaining process, the patentee 
or the potential entrant.
c. Whether the players had complete versus 
incomplete information with respect to their 
rivals’ payoffs.
Participants
96 undergraduate students from UNL.
Subjects were each paid $10 for participating and 
each could earn up to an additional $20 depending 
on their performance in the interactive game.
1. Licensing decision
3. Patent litigation decision
• The likelihood of patent litigation under 
infringement was smaller for broad rather than 
narrow patents.
• Innovators were more likely to litigate infringed 
patents when they faced a strong rather than a 
weak competitor and when they, rather than the 
potential entrants, initiated the licensing process. 
Conclusions
While some of the results conform with theoretical 
predictions, a few contest theoretical findings and 
give new insights on the factors affecting patent 
licensing behavior (e.g., the effect of the type of 
entrant on the likelihood of patent challenge and 
patent litigation). These first results will be used to
fine tune the experiments and run them using real 
life innovators as subjects.
• The likelihood of licensing was affected by the 
breadth of the patent in a manner consistent with 
theoretical predictions; broad patents were more 
likely to be licensed than narrow ones.
• The likelihood of licensing was greater under 
incomplete information where innovators were 
more likely to license to weak rivals.
• Contrary to theoretical findings, under complete 
information innovators were more likely to license 
to strong rivals.
1. In fact, more than 45% of patents are revoked during infringement trials 
(Allison and Lemley 1998) while 75% of the patents which are directly 
challenged end up being revoked or amended (Barton 2000). During 2002-
2004 the lawsuit loss rate for patent owners at the appellate level was 75.6% 
(Janicke and Ren 2006).